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OTA

OLL 84-3221
7 August 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

**SUBJECT: Briefing for Office of Technology Assessment (OTA)
on Ballistic Missile Defense and Antisatellite
(ASAT) Technologies**

1. On 7 August 1984, OTA staffers Richard DalBello, Michael Callahan, and Thomas Karas were briefed on Soviet ballistic missile defense and ASAT technologies. The briefers were [redacted] (DI/OSWR) and [redacted] (DI/SOVA). The briefing was conducted at the codeword level. [redacted]

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2. The attached correspondence describes the nature of the OTA study which led to the briefing. The two-hour session consisted of questions and answers related to Soviet technology and research in the ASAT field. [redacted]

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3. The OTA staffers asked for three CIA reports [redacted] which are being withheld pending CIA approval of OTA secure storage facilities. The staffers also indicated they would most likely seek an additional CIA briefing. [redacted]

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[redacted]
Liaison Division
Office of Legislative Liaison

Distribution:

Orig - OLL Record
1 - OLL Chrono
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Congress of the United States

OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

JOHN H. GIBBONS
DIRECTOR

July 6, 1984

[Redacted]
Office of Legislative Liaison
7B02
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20510

STAT

Dear [Redacted]

STAT

Pursuant to our conversation of July 5, I have enclosed copies of the House Armed Services and Senate Foreign Relations letters requesting OTA to study new ballistic missile defense and antisatellite (ASAT) technologies. Since the purpose of our visit to the CIA will be to obtain information on ASAT technology and policy, I have also included a draft outline of our proposed ASAT technical memorandum and annex. This should give you some idea of how we are approaching the problem and suggest what types of information we might find useful.

If I can be of further assistance please let me know. I look forward to hearing from you.

Sincerely,



Richard DalBello

Enclosures

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U.S. House of Representatives

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G. KIM WWCUP, STAFF DIRECTOR

March 5, 1984

Dr. John Gibbons
Director
Office of Technology Assessment
U. S. Congress
Washington, D. C. 20510

Dear Dr. Gibbons:

On March 23, 1983, President Reagan, during his news conference issued a call to the scientific community to focus attention on the means of rendering nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete.

Subsequent to the news conference, a National Security Study Directive (NSSD 6-83) called for two studies to explore this initiative. The studies were to:

- o Examine the role that defensive system deployments could play in the future security strategy of the free world;
- o Develop a long-range research and development program with the objective of developing and validating technologies for militarily effective systems to defend against ballistic missiles.

In response to NSSD 6-83, the Department of Defense convened a special study panel under the direction of Dr. James C. Fletcher, University of Pittsburgh, to perform a detailed analysis of the current and projected state of technology. The study addressed the status of the technology in conventional weapons, directed energy weapons, the ancillary systems—such as command, control and communications and data processing—system concepts, system integration, and countermeasures and tactics. As a consequence of this and other studies addressing defensive systems, the President intends to seek funds for a greatly expanded research and development program, which has been referred to as the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI).

The research and development choices in the SDI will be particularly difficult. However, an even more difficult problem arises from the likelihood that a major research and development effort could lead to the deployment of systems that will affect our national security. The effort could affect how the Soviets view the U. S. military posture and, hence, generate a Soviet reaction to the SDI. There is also a possible impact on strategic arms control to include the START negotiations, the prospects for a treaty

Dr. John Gibbons
March 5, 1984
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
limiting anti-satellite weapons and the viability of the ABM treaty of 1972. Still another important question is whether a deployment would tend to make the strategic balance and any concomitant international crisis more or less stable.

Accordingly, I request that your office undertake an assessment of the technologies delineated in the Fletcher Commission report as well as the ancillary issues that I have identified above. I am hopeful that your office could address the following three critical questions:


1. What actual capabilities—and in what time frame—can reasonably be expected of each of the technologies under consideration and which of these expectations are uncertain? I would strongly urge your office to coordinate closely with members of the Fletcher Commission to respond to this question as well as the questions arising from the countermeasures the Soviets might be expected to employ.
2. What, in the judgment of your office, would be the relationship between capabilities that can reasonably be expected and the impact of the technology exploitation effort on the overall strategic policy of the United States? This analysis should, if possible, include the impact of a deployed system on deterrence, crisis stability, arms control and on national security policy.
3. In view of this analysis, what policy options would be created for the United States?

I recognize that most of your analysis on this subject will be done on a classified basis. However, it would be helpful if as much of the findings as possible could be presented in an unclassified form.


Sincerely,



Melvin Price
Chairman



William L. Dickinson
Ranking Minority Member



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Member of Congress

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United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

SCOTT CONER, STAFF DIRECTOR
GERTYLD B. CHRISTIANSON, MINORITY STAFF DIRECTOR

March 20, 1984

Dr. John H. Gibbons
Director
Office of Technology Assessment
United States Congress
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Dr. Gibbons:

The Committee on Foreign Relations has conducted a series of hearings on the security and arms control implications of space-based and space-directed weapons, including anti-satellite weapons. The Committee subsequently unanimously approved S.J. Res. 129, which calls for an immediate, mutual and verifiable moratorium of limited duration on ASAT tests, immediate resumption of ASAT talks, and a comprehensive, verifiable treaty banning space-based or space-directed weapons.

As a complement to the Committee's hearings, the Office of Technology Assessment conducted a space arms control workshop and will soon publish a background paper on ballistic missile defense.



Based upon this earlier work, we believe that Congress would greatly benefit from an independent and thorough assessment of relevant technologies and their political and strategic implications. Accordingly, we are requesting that the Office of Technology Assessment continue its efforts in this area by undertaking an independent assessment of the following issues;

- the feasibility, effectiveness and cost of various space-based or space-directed concepts--whether to provide an anti-satellite weapons capability, limited defense of military assets or an overall defense of the nation;
- the implications of a major research and development program for space weapons--prior to a definite decision on whether to deploy such weapons--for crisis stability, the U.S.-Soviet arms competition, U.S. alliances, and existing arms control agreements.
- the possible effect of such weapons upon the viability of the U.S. military structure, including space-based assets.
- the likely consequences of such deployments on strategic stability, including the effect upon crisis management and upon the decision to engage in warfare;



- the implications of anti-satellite weapons and space-based or space-directed missile defense concepts for standing arms control agreements, particularly the Anti-Ballistic Missile, Outer Space and Limited Test Ban Treaties; and,
- the prospects for future space-related arms control agreements, including an assessment of advantages, disadvantages and verifiability.

We want to thank you very much for the excellent work done on the issue to date under OTA auspices and, in advance, for the valuable help to the Congress you and your staff will be rendering with the new assessment.

With every good wish.


Charles H. Percy
Chairman

Larry Pressler
U.S. Senator

Sincerely,


Claiborne Pell
Ranking Member

Paul E. Tsongas
U.S. Senator

07/06/84

Outline of
ASAT TECHNICAL MEMORANDUM

UNCL

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2.2 Scope

2.3 Overview

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12.6 Possible Effects of ASAT Arms Control Measures on Arms-Race Stability

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Appendix I

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- I.1 The 1981 Soviet Treaty Proposal (UN Document A/36/192)
- I.2 The 1983 Soviet Treaty Proposal (UN Document A/38/194)
- I.3 The 1983 Soviet ASAT Testing Moratorium
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Outline of
ANNEX
to
ASAT TECHNICAL MEMORANDUM (U)

*This will be ~~used~~
~~and~~
~~not~~ classified Annex
not codeword*

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2.0 Introduction (U)

2.1 Purpose (U)

2.2 Scope (U)

2.3 Overview (U)

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